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COMMANDER
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From: Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-44)

Subj: NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE SUPPORT OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

Ref: (a) CNO ltr 1300 Ser 44R/1U597846 of 17 Jun 91
(b) COMCBPAC ltr 1300 Ser CB30/889 of 08 Nov 91

Encl: (1) Naval Construction Force Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with reference (a) and is the final report on this operation superseding the interim report forwarded by reference (b). The lessons learned represent the major items identified by Naval Construction Force units assigned to the FIRST Marine Expeditionary Force. There were numerous other minor items which the respective Fleets and NAVFACENGCOM have taken for action that are not included in this report.

2. Many of the recommended solutions propose adding equipment, tools, parts, capabilities and training for battalion personnel. While each individual item appears to be a minor increase, the comprehensive additions will increase weight and cube to the Table of Allowance and necessitate additional school/training requirements particularly on the already heavily tasked Officer and Chief Petty Officer communities. As the complexity and speed of modern warfare increases, the military requirements to assure the ability of Seabees to defend themselves, exercise command and control, be self sufficient and simultaneously complete their construction mission in such an environment demands continuous, thoughtful evaluation and analysis when compared to current ROCs and POEs. In other words, Naval Mobile Construction Battalions may have reached the saturation point on expectations versus capabilities.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

DATE	C DATE	EVENT
AUGUST 1990		
02 AUG		Iraq invades Kuwait
07 AUG	C-DAY	Operation Desert Shield begins. NCF tasked to support I MEF. NMCBs FOUR, FIVE, SEVEN AND FORTY advised by phone to prepare to embark to Southwest Asia to support I MEF
08 AUG	C+1	COMCBPAC OPORDER 90-1 transmitted directing embarkation to Southwest Asia
17 AUG	C+10	First COMCBPAC FOXTROT DELTA personnel arrive in Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia
26 AUG	C+19	COMCBPAC FOXTROT DELTA and NMCB FIVE Air Det flights depart Port Hueneme
28 AUG	C+21	COMCBPAC FOXTROT DELTA and NMCB FIVE Air Det arrive in Al Jubayl
30 AUG	C+23	COMCBPAC FOXTROT DELTA deployment complete NMCB FOUR Air Det departs Roosevelt Roads, PR
31 AUG	C+24	NMCB FOUR Air Det arrives in Al Jubayl NMCB FIVE Air Det begins work on JNAF parking apron expansion and MAG 16 tent camp
SEPTEMBER 1990		
02 SEP	C+26	MV Constellation departs Guam with NMCB FORTY TOA
04 SEP	C+28	NMCB FOUR Air Det begins King Abdul Aziz Naval Base parallel taxiway project and MAG 13 tent camp
05 SEP	C+29	NMCB FIVE Air Det completes movement and begins ASP 2 construction
06 SEP	C+30	MV Greenridge with NMCB FIVE TOA departs Port Hueneme
10 SEP	C+34	First NMCB SEVEN Air Det flight departs Okinawa
11 SEP	C+35	NMCB SEVEN Air Det arrives in Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain
13 SEP	C+37	NMCB SEVEN Air Det begins 3rd MAW strongback camp, Shaikh Isa, Bahrain NMCB FOUR Air Det movement complete Last NMCB SEVEN Air Det flight arrives
14 SEP	C+38	NMCB FORTY Air Det arrives in Al Jubayl
15 SEP	C+39	MV DANAH departs Okinawa with NMCB SEVEN TOA NMCB SEVEN Air Det begins ASP and bomb dump work
16 SEP	C+40	NMCB FORTY Air Det and Advance Party final flight arrives in Al Jubayl
18 SEP	C+42	MV Maresk Constellation with NMCB FORTY TOA arrives at Al Jubayl
21 SEP	C+45	MV KUBBAR departs Roosevelt Roads, PR with NMCB FOUR TOA
24 SEP	C+48	First NMCB FORTY Main Body flight arrives

26 SEP	C+50	NMCB FIVE Advance Party arrives at Jubayl Naval Air Facility (JNAF)
27 SEP	C+51	Final NMCB FORTY Main Body flight arrives. First complete battalion in theater
29 SEP	C+54	NMCB FORTY begins ASP 1
30 SEP	C+55	NMCB SEVEN Advance Party arrives in Shaikh Isa
OCTOBER 90		
02 OCT	C+56	MV DANAH arrives at Mina Sulman, Bahrain with NMCB SEVEN's TOA
04 OCT	C+58	MAG 16 tent camp at JNAF complete
06 OCT	C+60	NMCB FORTY begins work on I MEF Command Post
07 OCT	C+61	MV GREENRIDGE arrives at Al Jubayl with NMCB FIVE's TOA and first AM-2 matting shipment NMCB FIVE starts MAG 16 galley construction
11 OCT	C+65	NMCB SEVEN Main Body arrives Shaikh Isa; Battalion movement complete; Administrative Support Unit, (ASU) Bahrain detail established
12 OCT	C+66	NMCB Five Main Body arrives JNAF; Battalion movement complete
13 OCT	C+67	NMCB FOUR and MWSS 174 begin to lay AM-2 matting at King Abdul Aziz Naval Base
14 OCT	C+68	NMCB FIVE and MWSS 374 begin to lay AM-2 matting at JNAF
15 OCT	C+69	MV KUBBAR arrives Al Jubayl with NMCB FOUR's TOA
17 OCT	C+71	NMCB SEVEN begins Shaikh Isa apron expansion
18 OCT	C+72	NMCB FOUR Main Body arrives Al Jubayl; Battalion movement complete. NCF deployment complete: moved 2,400 SEABEES and 1,125 pieces of CESE
21 OCT	C+75	NMCB FOUR starts FIRST FSSG Galley
22 OCT	C+76	NMCB FORTY starts FIRST MARDIV Galley NMCB FIVE starts I MEF R&R Center
30 OCT	C+84	I MEF Class IV yard opened; Jointly operated by NCF and USMC engineer units
NOVEMBER 90		
05 NOV	C+90	Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III tours NMCB FORTY's FIRST MARDIV galley project at Abu Hadriyah
07 NOV	C+92	Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III toured the Seabee camp and projects in in Shaikh Isa, Bahrain
09 NOV	C+94	RADM Jack E. Buffington, Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, U. S. Pacific Fleet and CUCM James Fuquay, Force Master Chief arrive to review Seabee work in SWA
10 NOV	C+95	Seabees participate in Marine Corps birthday observances
14 NOV	C+99	ASP 2 complete

16 NOV	C+101	RADM Buffington and CUCM Fuquay depart
17-19 NOV	C+102	NCF units participate in Exercise IMMINENT THUNDER FIRST MARDIV galley complete
22 NOV	C+107	Seabees attend Thanksgiving dinner with President and Mrs. Bush
23 NOV	C+108	NMCB FOUR starts Port Access Road in Jubayl
24 NOV	C+109	NMCBs FOUR, FIVE, SEVEN and FORTY start II MEF Bed Down Project near Camp 15 near Jubayl
25 NOV	C+110	NMCB FIVE completes Apron 2 at JNAF
27 NOV	C+112	I MEF moves into new headquarters in Jubayl Industrial Area
30 NOV	C+115	I MEF R&R Center complete at Camp 2 1/2

DECEMBER 90

01 DEC	C+116	Construction begins on THIRD MAW/MACC 38 base camp Construction of K-Span hangars for JNAF begins
03 DEC	C+117	Shaikh Isa ASP and bomb dump complete
04 DEC	C+119	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Advance Party arrives Shaikh Isa; NMCB SEVEN Advance Party departs for homeport
08 DEC	C+123	100 NMCB ONE personnel arrive to augment NMCB FORTY
09 DEC	C+124	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Main Body arrives in Shaikh Isa
10 DEC	C+125	NMCB SEVEN Main Body departs Saudi Arabia
11 DEC	C+126	NMCB TWENTY FOUR Advance Party arrives in Al Jubayl NMCB FOUR Advance Party departs Saudi Arabia THIRD NCR personnel arrive Another 100 NMCB ONE personnel arrive to augment NMCB FIVE EQCM Herman Hart, Master Chief of the Seabees, arrives to visit Seabees in SWA
14 DEC	C+129	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR begins move to Mishab
17 DEC	C+132	NMCB TWENTY FOUR Main Body arrives in Saudi Arabia NMCB FOUR Main Body departs Saudi Arabia
18 DEC	C+133	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR begins MAG 26 camp in Mishab
19 DEC	C+134	ASP 3 construction begun by NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Shaikh Isa parking apron expansion complete
23 DEC	C+138	NMCB FORTY begins FIRST MARDIV Division Support Area work at Manifah Bay
24 DEC	C+139	NMCB TWENTY FOUR begins Fleet Hospital FIFTEEN site preparation in Jubayl Industrial Area
26 DEC	C+141	EQCM Hart departs SWA
28 DEC	C+143	GEN A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, meritoriously promotes three Seabees
29 DEC	C+144	NMCB FORTY begins construction of Mobile Training Team ranges and base camp for SECOND MARDIV
31 DEC	C+146	NMCB FIVE starts construction of Aeromedical Staging Facility at JNAF

JANUARY 91

04 JAN	C+150	II MEF bed down camp complete
06 JAN	C+152	THIRD NCR forward element (THIRD NCR Main) moves to Safaniya with I MEF (MEF Main) forward headquarters
07 JAN	C+153	NMCB FIVE well drilling detail established in Kibrit NMCB SEVENTY FOUR begins work on Mishab airfield parking apron NMCB TWENTY FOUR completes port access road
08 JAN	C+154	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR begins MSR work west from Mishab
11 JAN	C+157	NMCB FIVE forward element moves to Kibrit to establish NCF support base.
12 JAN	C+158	NMCB FIVE works MSR east from Kibrit to Mishab
16 JAN	C+162	MTT road and ranges complete
17 JAN	D DAY	Operation Desert Storm begins with air campaign EPW compound started by NMCB FIVE Relocated THIRD MAW Headquarters complete at JNAF
18 JAN	D+1	Saudi Government authorizes full access to Tanajib NMCB FORTY detail begins work for MAG 16
20 JAN	D+3	FIRST and SECOND MARDIV galleys at Qarrah and Kibrit begin construction
28 JAN	D+11	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR ASU Bahrain Detail disestablished

FEBRUARY 91

02 FEB	D+16	NCFSU FOUR detail arrives in theater UCT TWENTY Air Detachment arrives in theater ASP 1 complete
07 FEB	D+21	FIRST and SECOND MARDIV galleys at Qarrah and Kibrit complete
08 FEB	D+22	EPW compound completed by NMCB FIVE NMCB ONE Details Advance Party departs
10 FEB	D+24	NMCB FORTY starts well drilling in Khanjar
12 FEB	D+26	NMCB FIVE with NMCB FORTY detail moves to Qarrah NMCB TWENTY FOUR moves forward element to Khanjar
14 FEB	D+28	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR establishes detail in Kibrit THIRD NCR Main moves with I MEF Main command post to Khanjar JNAF Aeromedical evacuation staging facility complete Remotely Piloted Vehicles runway and camp complex started
15 FEB	D+29	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR detail supporting Task Force Troy deploys
20 FEB	D+30	K-Span hangars at JNAF complete Fifth NMCB TOA arrives in Jubayl
21 FEB	D+35	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Task Force Troy detail returns to Mishab RPV runway and complex complete ASP 2 expansion for retrograde begins

24 FEB	G DAY	Ground offensive begins NMCB FIVE well site at Kibrit abandoned
26 FEB	G+2	Detail from NMCBs FIVE and TWENTY FOUR moves with advance elements of I MEF to Al Jaber Kuwait to prepare a forward command post
27 FEB	G+3	Al Jaber detail recalled to Saudi Arabia
28 FEB	G+4	Cease fire put into effect NMCB SEVENTY FOUR detail assigned to repair coastal MSR through Khafji NMCB ONE Details depart for ROTA, Spain

MARCH 91

01 MAR	G+5	THIRD NCR Main returns to Al Jubayl NMCB FORTY well drilling team and details in Tanajib and Qarrah return to Jubayl
05 MAR	G+9	NMCB FIVE forward element vacates Qarrah leaving a detail behind to maintain the MSR
06 MAR	G+10	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Khafji detail rejoins main body
07 MAR	G+11	Sixteen man Detail from THIRD NCR, NMCB SEVENTY FOUR and NMCB TWENTY FOUR enter Kuwait with USMC Historical Artifacts Team to recover captured Iraqi Armament and Equipment
08 MAR	G+12	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR begins work to expand ASP 3 for retrograde operations
12 MAR	G+16	NMCB FORTY Advance Party leaves Saudi Arabia
14 MAR	G+18	NMCB FORTY Main Body departs for Port Hueneme
15 MAR	G+19	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR detail Shaikh Isa disestablished
20 MAR	G+24	Equipment Recovery Detail returns to Al Jubayl
21 MAR	G+25	MV HAUGE sails with part of NMCB FORTY TOA for CONUS
22 MAR	G+26	NMCB FIVE detail Qarrah returns to Al Jubayl CAPT M. R. Johnson relieved by CAPT W. A. Waters as Commander, Third NCR
22 MAR	G+26	UCT TWO Air Detachment departs for Port Hueneme
26 MAR	G+30	NMCB TWENTY FOUR detail at King Abdul Aziz Naval Base disestablished
28 MAR	G+32	MV OBREGON sails for CONUS with part of NMCB FORTY TOA

APRIL 91

03 APR	G+38	NMCB TWENTY FOUR detail at Khanjar disestablished ASP 2 expansion complete
08 APR	G+40	MV BOBO sails with final part of NMCB FORTY TOA
10 APR	G+45	NMCB FIVE Advance Party departs Saudi Arabia
12 APR	G+47	NMCB FIVE Main Body arrives in Port Hueneme NMCB SEVENTY FOUR detail at Kibrit disestablished NMCB SEVENTY FOUR begins move to Al Jubayl
17 APR	G+52	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR move to Al Jubayl complete
22 APR	G+57	ASP 3 expansion work complete
25 APR	G+60	NMCB TWENTY FOUR departs for Gulfport
26 APR	G+61	NMCB FIVE TOA leaves theater aboard MV LOPEZ

MAY 91

06 MAY	G+71	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Advance Party departs Saudi Arabia
08 MAY	G+73	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR Main Body departs for Gulfport; 110 man delay party remains to load ships
		NCF equipment for Operation Provide Comfort airlifted to Turkey
11 MAY	G+76	NCFSU FOUR detachment departs for Gulfport
30 MAY	G+95	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR TOA departs aboard MV AMERICAN CONDOR for Port Hueneme

JUNE 91

03 JUN	G+99	Fifth TOA departs aboard MV CAPE HORN for Okinawa
09 JUN	G+105	NMCB TWENTY FOUR TOA departs aboard MV OSLO POLAR for Gulfport
13 JUN	G+109	NMCB SEVENTY FOUR delay party departs SWA

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) WARFARE LESSONS LEARNED

1. OBSERVATION: NCF personnel lack general CBR knowledge.

DISCUSSION: CBR training in the SCBT 980.1 is a yearly requirement. There is a long period between training sessions where people can forget this valuable information. Refresher training is needed for all personnel.

Homeport team training provides the basic knowledge for CBR survey and decon teams. Training is too short and most probably will not be adequate when facing a CBR threat. Training needs to be restructured and given more frequently at the battalion level.

Battalion CBR officers require more in-depth training than the homeport regiments can provide. Fort McClellan training is inadequate because it does not include how to conduct CBR operations in the field.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Require SCBT 980.1 for all personnel during homeport and during deployment. Reorient NCTC to concentrate on CBR team operations instead of providing information. Personnel should learn by actual "hands on" training to perform every task required of a chemical survey or decon team.

At least two CBR officers should be trained. They should attend a more comprehensive school such as the Army Chemical Corps school or Air Force Disaster Preparedness school.

2. OBSERVATION: Battalion is not staffed adequately to handle CBR matters during a contingency.

DISCUSSION: Battalions are required to have one E7 and one officer with CBR training. These are collateral duties which makes it difficult to insure that a battalion will be ready to operate in a CBR environment. More attention needs to be focused on maintaining the CBR gear in the TOA. To avoid the need to correct equipment deficiencies or resolving training shortfalls, assign CBR duties to a person full-time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The battalions need to create a CBR organization that is adequately trained and allowed to remain in place long enough to become fully functional. This organization should function under the S2 and control all CBR equipment and training. The organization should include an E4 or above should be assigned to track the expiration dates, serviceability and test CBR equipment monthly. The BA for battalion manning should be increased to allow for this full time person. In addition to the two trained men, a minimum of two company CBR reps should be assigned to participate in monthly meetings and training.

3. OBSERVATION: The M12A1 decon units need to be replaced and the number of decon units in the TOA increased.

DISCUSSION: These units are old and cumbersome three-piece units that require equipment support to be utilized properly. The latest training manual is dated May 1971. Units were found to need repairs prior to operation and one unit bent a connecting rod in its pump. A new portable unit, the M17 decon unit is available and in use by the Army.

The TOA has two M12A1 decon units which can be used for equipment, facilities or terrain decontamination or at a personnel decontamination station if no shower trailer is available. Two M12A1s are required for deliberate equipment decontamination. Under ideal conditions with no equipment failures, an experienced team would need ten days of continuous operations to decon all the CESE in the TOA. This would leave no other decon equipment available to treat personnel, facilities or terrain. After a CBR attack, the battalion needs to capability to operate two equipment decon lines, two personnel decon lines and two facilities/terrain decon teams. Each of these teams should be supported by a M17 decon unit.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Change the TOA to include two M17 decon units for the Air Det and four for the Main Body.

4. OBSERVATION: M258A1 and NAAK MARK1 training kits are needed for each man. Training should include use of training kits to instill troop confidence.

DISCUSSION: During training the actual use of the M258A1 skin decon kit improved everyone's understanding of how to use it. In homeport CBR decon team training (SCBT 980.2), when students were required to use a trainer auto-injector with the three eighths inch plastic injector, some were very hesitant to use it. Most people are reluctant to administer a needle to themselves. The repeated use of this training kit can help overcome the problem.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Include M258A1/NAAK MK1 trainers in the TOA. Ensure that each man in the battalion trains with the kit at least once in homeport and once on deployment.

5. OBSERVATION: There is no small pack available in which to carry a complete set of CBR gear. (two sets of MOPP with boots, gloves, and first aid kit) is not easily hauled around in a small alice pack. This arrangement is cumbersome and cannot be carried at all times.

DISCUSSION: The need to immediately attain higher MOPP levels requires that a complete set of MOPP gear. Personnel working in camp or on job sites without having this gear readily available have a good chance of succumbing to a blood or liquid nerve agent. A complete set of CBR gear is not easily hauled around which may cause individuals to leave it in their living/work space and not be ready to shift to MOPP gear.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Procure butt packs to carry MOPP gear.

6. OBSERVATION: Alarms to notify personnel about chemical attacks are needed in the TOA.

DISCUSSION: It is essential to react immediately to an actual or simulated chemical air raid/alerts. During CBR exercises it became very obvious that most people could not hear the makeshift alarms.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Install camp air raid sirens throughout camp. Install a unit similar to the M42 alarm in galleys, medical/dental and any other major work center. These alarm systems must be included in the TOA.

7. OBSERVATION: NCF lacks Chemical Agent Water Contamination Detection capability.

DISCUSSION: In a chemical environment, the NCF currently has no means to detect contaminants in water. Biological agents are more difficult to detect. However, chemical agents can be detected by the Chemical Agent Water Test Kit (M272) which is not the potable water test kit used by the medical department to determine the chlorine content of water supplies.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Add the M272 to the TOA.

8. OBSERVATION: TOA did not have enough atropine kits for every man.

DISCUSSION: In a CBR situation Marine Corps CBR doctrine calls for three kits for every man. NCF units supporting the Marine Corps need to have three kits for everyone in the battalion.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Double the inventory of atropine/2 pan chloride. Include NAP tables in TOA.

9. OBSERVATION: Use of Navy instead of Marine Corps CBR gear.

DISCUSSION: Most of the NCF's contingency work will be in support of the Marine Corps. The Marines use different chemical suits and masks. They are not familiar with our equipment which has a different design and life-span once exposed to uncontaminated air and requires different decontaminating techniques. Their mask has a hood attached to it and ours comes separately. Marines were unable to give us any technical assistance or advice on our CBR gear. The Marines plan to use the new M41 mask.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The NCF needs to adopt the Marine Corps CBR gear.

RESERVE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE LESSONS LEARNED

1. OBSERVATION: Reserve NMCBs were not as militarily ready as the active battalions.

DISCUSSION: Reserve NCF military skills were not adequate upon arrival in theater to meet all mission requirements. Specific shortfalls were in crew served weapons, use of the AT-4 vice the LAAW, full 360 degree perimeter defense, CBR, communications and command and control. These were all addressed by conducting supplemental training in theater. This training should have been completed prior to deploying. If the battalion had immediately been confronted with hostile fire or a CBR attack these deficiencies could have caused unnecessary casualties.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Reserve training needs to focus on military skills. The military training should parallel active battalion programs and if necessary should be at the expense of project work.

Mobilized Reserve NCF units should complete the full block of homeport military training including a complete field exercise prior to deploying to any contingency where hostile fire is possible. This requirement should not be waived regardless of the reported SORTs readiness. The military training must be factored into the time allotted to activate the unit and deploy it to the theater of operations.

If sufficient time is not available to provide the required military training, Reserve NCF units should be used to replace active units not in theater. The active battalion would be used to complete the contingency mission.

2. OBSERVATION: Reserve NMCBs have too many E-7 to E-9s .

DISCUSSION: Present reserve assignment policies allow grade substitutions which can cause a unit to become top heavy with E-7's through E-9's. This decreases the opportunity to assign E-6s responsible jobs. Placing E-7s and above in E-6 billets impacts adversely on the chain of command and unit morale. Staying within the authorized paygrade structure will improve effectiveness and unit morale.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:L Staff reserve battalions with the wartime authorization of 39 E-7s to E-9s.

3. OBSERVATION: Reserve battalions do not have a complete library of instructions, notices, and directives.

DISCUSSION: The recall to active duty placed requirements on reserve battalions that they do not normally face during Active Training periods. Examples are special incident reporting, operations security, and casualty assistance programs. The reserve administrative department is geared toward operating in a reserve/training environment. Active battalions have a more extensive library of instructions, notices and directives from which they can address these and other areas.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Reserve battalions should be outfitted with the same administrative and technical library as active battalions.

4. OBSERVATION: Recalled Reservists experienced numerous problems during the transition to active duty.

DISCUSSION: Reservists experienced a large number of problems when recalled to active duty. Many problems resulted from BUPERS/COMNAVRESFOR policies and procedures which do not appear to be coordinated with active personnel and pay procedures. This caused excessive work when recalling Reservists to active duty and made the transition more difficult than it had to be.

A typical example is for the Reservist who was on direct deposit for Naval Reserve pay. The individual had to be completely reprocessed after recall to be on direct deposit for active pay. Similar problems were encountered with medical care, family benefits, travel and dependent identification cards.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: A team lead by OP-095 should review all recall procedures and develop a list to streamline the process and to the maximum extent possible have the conversion accomplished by a transfer of information from one data base to another.

22. OBSERVATION: Automated logistics can not support battalion embarkation without considerable manual effort and can not interface with automated DOD logistics systems.

DISCUSSION: A battalion's logistics databases includes electronic stock records that reflect the entire inventory for a specific functional area. When embarking only the TOA and authorized augment items go with the battalion. Dividing these common databases and adjusting the on-hand stock balances to reflect what is going and what will remain behind is a tedious and complicated process when the present logistics software is used. Since CESE parts levels are based on the total unit load, logistics software does not help determine the what quantity of repair parts to take when organic and augment CESE are separated and additional augment CESE shipped from other sites is added to the equipment suit. The embarkation will force changes to the priority/status of outstanding requisitions requiring them to be quickly modified, cancelled or followed-up on via AUTODIN networks. Using present NCF logistics systems, all submissions are done manually making them slow, cumbersome, error-prone and in many cases ineffective due to the way inventory control points are designed.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Acquire the required hardware and revise present battalion logistics programs so data can be received and sent via AUTODIN in a format that is compatible with the prime DOD logistics networks.

C. MEDICAL

1. OBSERVATION: The current NMCB TOA includes items that are not likely to be used by a battalion aid station supporting a MEF.

DISCUSSION: Many medical supplies in the TOA are geared to a surgically staffed battalion aid station. Battalions are staffed with general medical officers (GMOs) who are unable to perform surgery. Modern medical evacuation procedures provide quick access to fleet hospital and surgical support units. Certain items in the NMCB TOA (e.g., cranial and orthopedic surgery equipment) are only used by surgeons and are of no use to a battalion supporting a MEF. Deleting these extra items would reduce the weight and cube of the medical TOA to allow for other items either for medical or other battalion functions.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Reevaluate the medical mission of a Battalion Aid Station supporting a MEF. Review the medical TOA for items that can be eliminated because the battalion lacks medical personnel with the skills and training to use them.

2. OBSERVATION: The current NMCB medical TOA will not support mass casualty and trauma care.

DISCUSSION: The current NMCB medical TOA is not adequate to support a Battalion Aid Station (BAS) in a mass casualty situation. These situations require Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) stocking levels of equipment and supplies. There is an inadequate quantity of supplies to support a 600 man battalion in combat. It does not have a number of critically needed items. Mass casualty care items such as chest tubes, pleuravacs, oxygen tubing, oxygen bottle regulators, IV catheters, and foley bags are not in the TOA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Mass casualty items in bulk quantities need to be included to complete the TOA. Consider using the ATLS standards with sufficient quantities to support multiple detachments

3. OBSERVATION: The NMCB medical TOA and the Marine BAS AMAL are not compatible.

DISCUSSION: The NMCB medical TOA is more analogous to a Group Aid Station than to a Marine BAS (e.g., NMCB TOA has full surgical X-Ray and dental equipment; Marine BAS does not). MEDLOG companies do not fill line by line supply items, but instead replace entire AMAL's. Many requested resupply items were disallowed because the Marines consider the NMCB medical department to be a BAS.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: The NCF must insure that the Marine Medical Logistical Battalion is aware that the NMCB Medical Department has capabilities and equipment that exceed that found in a Marine BAS. The Marines must take these into account when planning their supply stocking levels and resupply plans.

4. OBSERVATION: X-Ray machine and film developers were difficult to operate in the desert.

DISCUSSION: X-Ray machines were shut down because of the harsh environment and inability to obtain supplies. Battalion clinics did not have a controlled environment and the heat destroyed the X-Ray developer. The Battalion X-Ray developers require forced water to operate. If running water is not available, which is to be expected in field conditions, the X-Ray machine can not be used.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Either the present X-Ray machine must be replaced with one that can operate in extreme temperatures or a controlled temperature environment tent for the X-ray machine should be included in the TOA. All battalion X-Ray developers should be manual (dip tank type) rather than automatic water fed systems. This will allow X-Ray capability immediately upon arrival.

D. TOOLS and SUPPLIES

1. OBSERVATION: The NCF and the Marines use different rifles and pistols causing problems with ammunition and spare parts.

DISCUSSION: The TOA contains four thousand rounds of .45 ammunition. The Marines use the 9mm pistol in place of the M1911A1 .45 caliber pistol. They do not carry .45 ammunition and cannot resupply attached NMCBs. With approximately one hundred thirty personnel in each battalion carrying the M1911A1 each only has approximately thirty rounds of ammunition. This is not sufficient to conduct proficiency training and leaves little available to replace rounds expended.

The Marines use the M16A2 which uses different 5.56 ball ammunition from the M16A1 used by the NCF. Although both rounds are the same size, they have different performance characteristics. Use of the M16A2 ammunition in the M16A1 dramatically degrades accuracy and could cause damage to the weapon and injury to the shooter.

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4. OBSERVATION: X-Ray machine and film developers were difficult to operate in the desert.

DISCUSSION: X-Ray machines were shut down because of the harsh environment and inability to obtain supplies. Battalion clinics did not have a controlled environment and the heat destroyed the X-Ray developer. The Battalion X-Ray developers require forced water to operate. If running water is not available, which is to be expected in field conditions, the X-Ray machine can not be used.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: Either the present X-Ray machine must be replaced with one that can operate in extreme temperatures or a controlled temperature environment tent for the X-ray machine should be included in the TOA. All battalion X-Ray developers should be manual (dip tank type) rather than automatic water fed systems. This will allow X-Ray capability immediately upon arrival.

D. TOOLS and SUPPLIES

1. OBSERVATION: The NCF and the Marines use different rifles and pistols causing problems with ammunition and spare parts.

DISCUSSION: The TOA contains four thousand rounds of .45 ammunition. The Marines use the 9mm pistol in place of the M1911A1 .45 caliber pistol. They do not carry .45 ammunition and cannot resupply attached NMCBs. With approximately one hundred thirty personnel in each battalion carrying the M1911A1 each only has approximately thirty rounds of ammunition. This is not sufficient to conduct proficiency training and leaves little available to replace rounds expended.

The Marines use the M16A2 which uses different 5.56 ball ammunition from the M16A1 used by the NCF. Although both rounds are the same size, they have different performance characteristics. Use of the M16A2 ammunition in the M16A1 dramatically degrades accuracy and could cause damage to the weapon and injury to the shooter.